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Darfur is regularly debated by the UN Security Council, 
African Union forces have been deployed and some 9,000 
humanitarian workers are trying to help over two million 
displaced people. Clearly, Darfur cannot be described as 
a ‘forgotten emergency’. Why, then, does ﬁghting persist 
and the needs of many of the uprooted go unmet?
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undreds are still dying each 
day in Darfur from starva-
tion, disease and violence. 
With fighting continuing between 
rebel forces and government troops, 
more and more people are being 
driven from their homes, joining 
the ranks of the 2.4 million already 
internally displaced and the 200,000 
refugees in Chad. Government mili-
tary attacks continue on black Afri-
can farming communities and on IDP 
camps, supported by the Janjaweed 
militia. Women and girls continue 
to be raped searching for firewood 
outside the camps while those inside 
remain totally dependent on interna-
tional aid. 
Being on the world agenda has not 
yet led to meaningful steps to end 
the fighting or even adequately to 
address the needs of those uproot-
ed. So what is it that has impeded 
the international response, and what 
positive elements can be identified 
that can be built upon in responding 
to this and future emergencies?  
One reason the international com-
munity finds the Darfur problem dif-
ficult to address is that state reliance 
on excessive force against ethnic or 
racial groups seeking greater autono-
my is not unique to Sudan. Other 
governments bent on maintaining 
the dominance of a particular ethnic 
group have also waged brutal wars 
against their own populations. The 
Russian Federation, for example, has 
conducted a scorched earth cam-
paign against the Chechens. A veto-
wielding permanent member of the 
Security Council, Russia has opposed 
diplomatic pressure or sanctions 
against the Sudanese government for 
fear of setting a precedent.  
 
A second reason for the lack of 
strong international response is 
the absence of tools and struc-
tures available to the international 
community to address internal 
crises. Other than the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, which 
is often denied entry into internal 
strife situations, there exists no 
international machinery readily 
available to protect civilians caught 
up in violence within their own coun-
tries. There is a Genocide Conven-
tion1 but there are no international 
mechanisms for preventing genocide 
or mass killings and no enforcement 
machinery.
Only during the last decade of the 
20th century did the international 
community become involved in try-
ing to assist and protect persons up-
rooted and at risk within their own 
countries. International involvement 
IDP mother and duaghter return from collecting wood in 
the bush, outside Manjura camp, Darfur.
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with internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) is therefore still ad hoc and 
fledgling. While there is a Represen-
tative of the UN Secretary-General 
on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons it is a voluntary 
position and the small internal dis-
placement division within the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitari-
an Affairs (OCHA) is non-operational. 
On the ground, there are increasing 
numbers of international humani-
tarian organisations and NGOs that 
provide material aid to IDPs but little 
in the way of protection of IDPs’ 
physical security and human rights.2 
In Darfur, an area the size of France, 
the Secretary-General reports only 
26 international staff with protection 
responsibilities and 16 human rights 
observers.3 
 
By and large, the international 
community can be relied upon to 
respond effectively to famines or to 
natural disasters. In cases of geno-
cide, large-scale massacres or ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, as in Darfur, international 
action is dependent on whether 
states consider it in their interests 
to take the risks required. In 1999 
the UN Secretary-General spoke of a 
“developing international norm in fa-
vour of intervention to protect civil-
ians from wholesale slaughter”4 and 
a recent high-level UN panel talks of 
an international “responsibility to 
protect”5 but in fact only in a small 
number of cases has the Security 
Council authorised the use of force 
to protect IDPs and other civilians at 
risk. Nor is there any international 
enforcement machinery, whether a 
standby police force or a rapid reac-
tion military force, to protect IDPs 
in camps or on return home. There 
is not even assurance that perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity in 
Darfur will be prosecuted before the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
despite a Security Council resolution 
referring such cases to the court.
Wider interests stymie 
humanitarian intervention
The geopolitical concerns of Security 
Council members constitute a fur-
ther impediment to strong action. Al-
geria and Pakistan, which have close 
political ties to Arab and Islamic 
governments, have worked to delay 
and weaken international action on 
Darfur. As the main foreign investor 
in Sudan’s oil industry, China holds 
a 40% share in the international 
consortium extracting oil in Sudan.6 
China has abstained on resolutions 
threatening sanctions against Sudan, 
in particular against its petroleum 
sector, and threatened to use its veto 
against resolutions if they were too 
strong.  
The US and the EU have also had 
reasons to avoid confrontation with 
Sudan. Even though the US did initi-
ate action in the Security Council, 
it feared, like the EU, that pressing 
the Sudanese government too far on 
Darfur could jeopardise the peace 
agreement about to be finalised be-
tween north and south. The US had 
invested heavily in the peace process 
and did not want to give any excuse 
to Sudan to walk away from it. Sudan 
played this card skillfully, using the 
progress it made in the north-south 
peace process to deflect attention 
from the situation in Darfur. 
A further impediment to robust 
action is the secondary status of 
Africa itself. By and large, western 
governments do not consider it to be 
in their national or strategic inter-
est to take the political, financial or 
military risks needed to stop killings 
on the African continent. While they 
readily denounce the atrocities and 
provide generous humanitarian help, 
the costs of becoming involved in 
trying to stop the killings are consid-
ered too high. 
US threats to veto any Security 
Council resolution referring 
war crimes in Darfur to the 
ICC – only lifted at the end 
of March – deadlocked the Security 
Council. Moreover, fallout from the 
US invasion of Iraq has had signifi-
cant impact. Although Iraq was not 
occupied for humanitarian or human 
rights reasons, the Bush Administra-
tion fell back on this rationale when 
no weapons of mass destruction 
could be found. US expressions of 
concern about Darfur have therefore 
been met with much scepticism in 
the Arab and Muslim worlds and 
encouraged speculation that the US 
was preparing to invade another 
Islamic state. The whole idea of 
humanitarian intervention to protect 
civilians in Darfur was undermined 
by the US action in Iraq, even though 
the situation in Darfur had deterio-
rated to the point where humanitar-
ian intervention should have been an 
option to consider. 
All these factors have worked to 
enfeeble the international response. 
It took more than a year for the 
Security Council to adopt a resolu-
tion on Darfur, which it finally did 
in July 2004. No sanctions were in-
troduced until March 2005 and then 
only symbolic ones (travel bans and 
asset freezes) even though Sudan 
had failed to halt attacks against its 
civilian population or to disarm and 
prosecute the Janjaweed. More-
over, abstentions by China, Algeria, 
Pakistan and Russia weakened the 
authority of the resolutions. 
Nonetheless, some positive features 
have emerged from the crisis. Dip-
lomatic pressure, when exerted, has 
produced results. Visits to Darfur by 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell in 
July 2004 led the Khartoum regime 
to significantly, but not entirely, 
lift restrictions on humanitarian 
organisations – they still lack access 
to some 500,000 IDPs. The govern-
ment also allowed entry to interna-
tional human rights monitors and to 
the UN team investigating whether 
genocide had occurred. Furthermore, 
the government resumed talks with 
the Darfur rebels, under the auspices 
of the African Union (AU) although 
little progress has been made. More 
pressure is needed now, ideally from 
countries like China and members 
of the Arab League as well as from 
the US.  
The role played by the AU, if devel-
oped to its full potential, also offers 
promise. With the international com-
munity unwilling to act, the AU came 
forward to try to stop the violence 
in its own region. After helping to 
negotiate the April 2004 ceasefire 
between the Darfur rebels and 
the government, the AU deployed 
several hundred unarmed observ-
ers to monitor it. When the fighting 
continued, the AU deployed armed 
peacekeepers to protect the moni-
tors and then expanded the numbers 
to be sent in and the mandate itself 
so that its police and troops could 
increase security for IDP camps and 
IDP returns, and protect civilians 
under ‘imminent threat’. Rwanda’s 
President, Paul Kagame, even an-
nounced publicly that Rwandan 
troops would not stand by if civilians 
were attacked.  
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At the same time, AU forces have 
done little in fact to protect IDPs 
because the Sudanese government 
has opposed an AU protection role 
and the AU mandate is insufficiently 
strong. Nor does the AU have ad-
equate resources or staff to do the 
job. To date, it has been able to field 
only 2,300 monitors, troops and 
police to Darfur but even the 7,700 
intended would be far too small for 
an area which, experts say, needs as 
many as 50,000. The organisation 
has few aircraft or vehicles to trans-
port its police and troops and insuf-
ficient communications equipment, 
tents, boots and other basic equip-
ment. Western and other countries 
have tended to exaggerate the capa-
bility of the AU because they do not 
want to become involved in a more 
robust way. Nonetheless, they have 
pledged funds and logistical support 
and are also airlifting AU troops into 
Darfur, albeit slowly. This combina-
tion of regional involvement backed 
up by international support has 
the potential to become a more 
viable permanent arrangement for 
responding to conflict and displace-
ment in Africa. Regional involve-
ment, moreover, has proved a more 
palatable arrangement for the Suda-
nese government than international 
forces. Still, matters have reached 
such a pass that bringing in interna-
tional peacekeepers to bolster the AU 
forces is now being considered.
Another development worth noting 
is the attention being paid to politi-
cal solutions to the crisis. Whereas 
in most humanitarian emergencies 
the main focus of the international 
effort is to deliver aid, in this crisis 
international pressure brought about 
a north-south peace agreement in 
January 2005, which could provide 
the basis for addressing the conflict 
in Darfur. The north-south agree-
ment provides for power and wealth 
sharing between the government and 
southern black African tribes with 
annexes extending to ethnic groups 
in Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and 
the southern Blue Nile. Certainly, 
an annex could be negotiated for 
Darfur. Moreover, southern Suda-
nese leader John Garang, soon to 
become Vice President, has promised 
to promote a fair and just settlement 
in Darfur.
The agreement, if carried out, should 
move Sudan in the direction of 
becoming a multi-ethnic, multi-ra-
cial and multi-religious society, an 
important development given that 
more than 50% of Sudan’s popula-
tion is black African. Francis Deng, 
former Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on Internally Displaced 
Persons, and a southern Sudanese, 
has noted that the efforts of the rul-
ing Arab-Islamic minority to depict 
Sudan as an Arab Muslim country 
distorts realities of the country as 
a whole and the racial composition 
of those who view themselves as 
Arab.7 Enabling Sudan to reflect its 
diversity is one sure way of resolving 
the Darfur crisis and bringing the 
displaced home.    
 
The continuing violence in Darfur 
makes it abundantly clear that 
there is a long way to go before 
an international system to protect 
people caught up in violence in their 
own countries can be put in place. 
Nonetheless, there are elements to 
build on. 
Greater attention should be paid to 
strengthening the AU and support-
ing a role for it in promoting the 
security of IDPs on the continent 
– a step not only important for 
Darfur but for the more than 12 
million IDPs in Africa. Governments 
and civil society around the world 
whose voices have been influential 
on Darfur should now press for the 
expansion of the north-south peace 
agreement to Darfur and oppose 
the going forward of any economic 
aid and investment or debt relief 
for Sudan’s government until the 
conflict and displacement currently 
overwhelming western Sudan are 
brought to an end.
Roberta Cohen is co-director of the 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal 
Displacement (www.brookings.edu/
fp/projects/idp/idp.htm). Email: 
RCOHEN@brookings.edu 
The next issue of FMR will focus on 
Sudan. Deadline for submissions: 
15 June.
1. www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/
text.htm 
2. See interview with Walter Kälin on page 4 
and Protect or Neglect: Toward A More Effective 
United Nations Approach to the Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons, Brookings-SAIS 
Project on Internal Displacement and the Internal 
Displacement Division, OCHA, 2004. www.brook.
edu/fp/projects/idp/protection_survey.htm
3. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the Sudan, S/2005/140, 4 March 
2005, para.26.
4. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/ 
19990920.sgsm7136.html 
5. A more secure world: Our shared responsibil-
ity, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United 
Nations, 2004 www.un.org/secureworld 
6. Peter S Goodman,‘China Invests Heavily in 
Sudan’s Oil Industry’, Washington Post, December 
23, 2004. www.genocidewatch.org/SudanChinaIn
vestsHeavily23December2004.htm 
7. See FMR22, www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR22/FMR2225.pdf 
UNHCR protection 
assistant, Rihab 
Kamal, talks with 
displaced Masselit 
woman, Riyadh 
IDP camp, El 
Geneina, West 
Darfur.
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